This article first discusses the legal context in which transgender claims have arisen in Canada. It then examines the Nixon complaint, its challenges for feminism, and its possible role in the ongoing debate over feminist legal action. Although certain views about the merits ofthe case are expressed,' neither "side" is vindicated. This article has different aims. Specifically, it seeks to illuminate some of the philosophical underpinnings of the debate; to discuss the risks of rights-based discourse; and to point to some larger lessons that all those interested in equality-seeking strategies-but particularly feminists-can take from this experience.
Legal Framework for Transgender Claims in Canada
In Canada, transgender claims to date have arisen in the human rights context. In the Northwest Territories, "gender identity" has been added as a specific prohibited ground of discrimination.'" In other jurisdictions, including British Columbia, Quebec, and the federal system, cases have established that discrimination based on "sex" includes discrimination against transgendered individuals.'' In Ontario, the Human Rights Commission released a policy paper'â greeing with this interpretation. Several cases have vindicated transgendered persons' complaints. For the purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, colour, ancestry, nationality, ethnic origin, place of origin, creed, religion, age, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, family status, family affiliation, political belief, political association, social condition and a conviction for which a pardon has been granted. In a case involving discriminatory state action, a transgendered person could seek a remedy through section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.^'* In some foreign jurisdictions, such as the United States, it is necessary to decide whether a pre-or post-operative transgendered person is male or female'^ and then work backward from that fact to determine whether any alleged unequal treatment is on the basis of "sex." In Canada, section 15 includes more grounds of discrimination. Therefore, a sex determination is not strictly necessary in every case. For example, a transgendered person who can demonstrate that she is subject to a burden or withheld a benefit on the basis of transsexual status likely need not establish whether she is "male" or "female." Although some transgender claims could fall under the enumerated grounds of "sex" or "disability," Canadian courts are more likely to recognize that such discrimination relates to a new, analogous ground'^ of "gender identity."'Ĥ owever, depending on the justification offered by the respondent, a person's actual (or former) sex could be relevant, as noted by the BC Supreme Court in Nixon:
Ferris v. O.T.E.U.. Local 15 (1999)
[Nixon's] previous male characteristics could be relevant in some cases. Two examples come to mind. One is participation as a female subject of medical research which sought to distinguish between males and females (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal henefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disahility.
15. Pearlman, supra note 1 at n. 9. 16. For a summary of the approach to determining analogous grounds see as defined by chromosomal makeup, such as a study of baldness. A second is competition as a female in certain sports.'T hus Nixon emerged at a time when Canadian law had begun to recognize the legal status and rights of transgendered persons. In most contexts, such claims would enjoy the support of feminists and equality advocates alike. There has, though, been little recognition of the possible limits to the notion of "equal treatment" between such persons and (particularly) women bom as women. Nor has there been sustained thought within the feminist movement over the possible confiicts that can arise. Nixon thrusts that confiict into a harsh spotlight.
The Nixon Complaint
Kimberly Nixon is a woman who was bom a man. Through a combination of surgery and other treatment, she completed sex reassignment." Pursuant to section 27(1) of the Vital Statistics Act,^° she changed her birth certificate. In August 1995, Nixon responded to an advertisement by Rape Relief for volunteer peer counselors and attended an initial training session. Nixon's stated motivation for doing this related to male violence that she experienced both before and shortly after her sex reassignment surgery.^' At a pre-screening interview, and as a condition to joining the collective, Nixon indicated her acceptance of Rape Reliefs four core beliefs: (1) violence is never a woman's fault; (2) women have the right to choose an abortion; (3) women have the right to choose their sexual partners; (4) volunteers agree to work, on an ongoing basis, on their existing prejudices including racism. ^N ixon "passed" the pre-screening and was invited to the next regularly scheduled training session. It was during that session that a Rape Relief facilitator 18 . Nixon (BCSC), supra note 3 at para. 38. If a person in respect of whom trans-sexual surgery has heen performed is unmarried on the date the person applies under this section, the director must, on application made to the director ... change the sex designation on the registration ... in such a matter that the sex designation is consistent with the intended results ofthe trans-sexual surgery.
21. Nixon (BCHRT), supra note 3 at para. 21. 22. Ibid, at para. 23. asked her to leave. The facilitator's notes indicate that she identified Nixon as a man solely on the basis of her appearance. The facilitator advised Nixon that "women had to be oppressed since birth to be a volunteer at Rape Relief, and that because she [Nixon] had lived as a man she could not participate."" The next day, Nixon filed a human rights complaint.^" Rape Relief, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, first sought judicial review ofthe decision to hear the complaint. The BC Supreme Court held that the Human Rights Code's^^ prohibited ground of "sex" discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of "transsexualism."^^ Rape Relief did not challenge this finding, and the case proceeded on the basis that Nixon was excluded from Rape Relief because of sex. Neither of the named applicants disputed Rape Reliefs contention that it is a "women-only" space permitted by statute to exclude men. They disagreed only with Rape Reliefs claim that, for its purposes, Kimberly Nixon is not a "woman." The dispute raises a number of legal issues^' of which only a few are discussed in this article: the required elements, in the human rights context, of a prima facie case; whether Rape Reliefs decision is based on a bona fide occupational qualification; and whether Rape Relief can rely on the exemption found in section 41 ^^ ofthe Code. (i) Is a denial ofthe opportunity to volunteer, based on sex, a violation ofthe discrimination in employment provisions contained in s. 13(l)(a) or (b) ofthe Code?
(ii) Is the training program offered by Rape Relief a service to the puhlic such that discrimination based on sex with respect to it is a violation of s. Rape Relief argued that Nixon, as part of her prima facie case, needed to demonstrate that Rape Relief did more than treat her differently hecause of her sex-she needed to demonstrate that the organization violated her human dignity. Rape Relief relied on the Supreme Court of Canada's synthesis of the test hy which discrimination is now analyzed under section 15 of the Charter. Although Nixon is a human rights complaint, Rape Relief argued that discrimination claims require the same approach.
Rape Relief used a legal development that has caused great concern to some feminists and equality rights advocates.^' The so-called "human dignity" approach to equality derives from the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Law v. Canada.^" In Law, the Court attempted to draw together several divergent approaches that have plagued its previous section 15 decisions.'' The Court held that the appropriate focus for a court deciding a prima facie claim of discrimination is the "essential purpose of section 15," which it described as prevent[ing] the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and [promoting] a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.^T he Court stressed that the analysis must he undertaken from the perspective of "a person in circumstances similar to those of the claimant, who is informed of and rationally takes into account the various contextual factors which determine whether an impugned law infringes human dignity."" While the stress on human If a charitable, philanthropic, educational, fraternal, religious or social organization or corporation that is not operated for profit has as a primary purpose the promotion of the interests and welfare of an identifiable group or class of persons characterized by ... a common ... sex ... [ dignity may appear benign or even helpful to equality claimants, the decisions issued since Law have shown it to be a vague and malleable tool^'* that can impose a significant burden on a Charter plaintiff. In several cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that laws, which unquestionably had an adverse impact on disadvantaged persons, nevertheless did not violate their human dignity. ^T hus, Rape Relief appropriated a controversial element of equality jurisprudence to cut off Nixon's discrimination claim "at the pass." Rape Reliefs argument exposes the tension that equality advocates face when responding to a discrimination claim. It was, understandably, important to Rape Relief that it not be found to have "discriminated" against Nixon. Nonetheless, Rape Relief essentially suggested that Nixon's claim engaged no dignitary interest. Specifically, Rape Relief argued that "no reasonable person would feel that their dignity was impacted by being excluded, like most other British Columbians, from the training program at a small, not-for-profit, women's shelter."^^ If accepted. Rape Reliefs argument could set a damaging precedent for the treatment of other novel claims. The conclusion that a particular law harms "human dignity" inevitably is influenced by social location, historical experience, and privilege. Those who are truly "marginal" tend to be constmcted as less reasonable. ^ An approach to discrimination filtered through the viewpoint of the "reasonable disadvantaged person" makes it more difficult for those who occupy society's margins to gain recognition and respect. Indeed, the Human Rights Tribunal rejected Rape Reliefs position. The tribunal found that "human dignity" The element of human dignity that has now been injected into the s. 15 jurisprudence is, in my view, vague, eonfusing and burdensome to equality claimants ... The element of human dignity is a reversion to the idea that was rejected in Andrews, namely, that s. 15 should be restricted to unreasonable or unfair distinctions. 36. Nixon (BCHRT), supra note 3 at para. 90. 37. I have borrowed this idea fi"om the comments of an anonymous reviewer, with thanks.
has not achieved the status of a "stand-alone" criterion under the Law test.'^ In the alternative, it held, the particular context of human rights complaints makes it inappropriate to require that complainants demonstrate a specific injury to "human dignity."^' Rape Reliefs second argument was that its volunteer counselors, to perform their roles, need the experience of female socialization since hirth.'"' Rape Relief stated:
There is a significant danger that a male counselor, someone who may still have some male characteristics though dressed as a female or a man disguised as a woman will he disturbing to someone already extremely disturbed or afraid.'"
The trihunal was unconvinced hy the evidentiary hasis offered to support the "female-socialization" criterion. Rape Reliefs principal expert, Dr. Ingrid Pacey, testified that women entering therapy for a male-perpetrated sexual assault generally have a profound fear of men. Tribunal memher, Heather MacNaughton, appeared to accept this observation as well as Pacey's statement that a good therapist must he ahle to demonstrate "accurate empathy.""*^ However, when Pacey said that a therapist or counselor who had lived part of her life as a male should not offer therapy to a female victim of sexual assault, MacNaughton characterized the opinion as "hypothetical" hecause Pacey lacked experience in actual counseling sessions involving transgendered women. Similarly, the trihunal was unimpressed hy the testimony of Rape Relief members. MacNaughton noted that one memher. Lee Lakeman, did not seem to accept that Nixon was a woman at all.'*'' Another member, Edith Swain, mistaking a woman in the hearing room for a man, indicated that she would feel uncomfortable with the woman as a counselor.'*''
In contrast, the tribunal found that Nixon was an exemplary counselor, based in part on her successful participation in a group peer counseling session at Battered Women's Support Services (BWSS). Another women's shelter. Women against Violence against Women (WAVAW), welcomed transgendered clients and volunteers. It is noteworthy that at least some women's centres, facing a dilemma similar to Rape Reliefs, have decided to include transgendered persons. However, other evidence in the record throws the significance of this fact into some doubt. First, Kimberly Nixon actually left BWSS hecause she felt it was insufficiently welcoming of transgendered persons. It is unclear from the record how many BWSS members ever realized that Nixon was not bom and socialized 38 . Nixon (BCHRT), supra note 3 at para. as a woman.''^ Second, while WAV AW indicated it had adopted a "transgenderfriendly" policy, it had not yet employed any transgendered women as volunteers.
In addition, when evaluating Nixon's fitness as a counselor, the tribunal may have conflated the significance of a person's actual gender experience and identity, with the perception of that person's gender by female victims of male violence. As mentioned earlier, a crucial moment during the hearing occurred when Rape Relief member Edith Swain misidentified a biological woman (Sheila Gilooly) as a man and stated her discomfort were she, Swain, to encounter the woman in a women-only space. The tribunal used this moment to illustrate the truism that appearances can be deceptive and, more importantly, to refute Rape Reliefs initial rejection of Nixon. Yet is this the entire story? After all, when confronted, Nixon readily admitted that she had lived part of her life as a man. Had Gilooly explained to Swain that she was indeed a woman. Swain's discomfort might have ceased, and, in any event, she might not have been entitled to demand a different counselor. This admittedly dramatic moment did not resolve the underlying issues.
Ultimately, the tribunal found that Rape Relief did not offer sufficient evidence that including transgendered women would make it "impossible" for Rape Relief to fulfill its objects. Rape Relief made no efforts to accommodate Nixon other than offering the standard response given to male applicants: that she join a fundraising group. Since an employer must accommodate to the point of "undue hardship," the tribunal reasoned. Rape Reliefs failure to consider any intermediate steps did not satisfy the legal test under which a bona fide occupational qualification is upheld,'** While the tribunal's reasoning makes sense in a conventional employment discrimination claim, the reasoning is inadequate given Nixon's particular context. Rape Relief is making a statement about women's place and treatment in society. Rape Relief believes that being socialized as a woman, which includes experiencing the various physical, emotional, and sexual markers of female development, is integrally connected to a woman's sense of herself as a gendered person. This experience informs her understanding of how all women are vulnerable to male sexual violence, and this understanding, Rape Relief ardently believes, is the core precept that links members of Rape Relief as a collective. The tribunal did not consider whether Rape Relief is entitled to rely on this belief on its own merits. Instead, the tribunal held that Rape Relief should have considered any altematives to the most drastic response that flows from that belief-namely, excluding people such as Nixon. Yet, since the belief concems precisely who can be a member of the Rape Relief collective, it is difficult to see what "reasonable" altematives exist.
Rape Rape Relief submitted that one of its primary objects is to promote the interests of women who share a distinct political belief-that being female from birth is required to participate in the political work of combating the inferior social status of women. Of course, Kimberly Nixon argues that she also shares the life-long experience of being "female" or, at least, has shared it fi-om the age of five, which is when she claims to have first realized that her physical sex did not match her gender identity. However, Rape Relief defines "life-long experience" to include a person's physical sex markers and the socialization process that results from being treated as a particular gender: "[C]hildhood socialization, life-long relationships to reproduction and the experience of a particular type of subordination."''* The tribunal's disposition on this point was somewhat confiised. MacNaughton relied on various factors to reject the argument. First, Rape Reliefs stated objects did not specifically include the "political belief that it identifiedthe so-called "belief was actually a common "life experience" and therefore did not qualify under section 41 of the Code. Second, Rape Relief did not demonstrate that non-transsexual women have a shared, common life experience, and it did not screen potential volunteers to ensure that they do.''^ Third, Rape Reliefs exclusionary policy was underinclusive because any screening occurred only when a volunteer's appearance "triggered" an inquiry into whether she had lived part of her life as a man.'°O n further application for judicial review by the British Columbia Supreme Court, Rape Relief was successful, but in several respects its victory is problematic. Justice E.R.A. Edwards ruled that Nixon had not made out a prima facie claim of discrimination. He based this conclusion on several factors: the need to respect legally sex-segregated organizations; the application of section 41 of the Code; and the appropriate use, in the human rights regime, of the Law "human dignity" standard.
Edwards J. first noted that neither Nixon nor the deputy chief commissioner disputed Rape Reliefs ability to exclude men. He noted as well that all parties accepted that the line between "male" and "female" is arbitrary because the concept of "sex" is now recognized as occupying a "continuum." Therefore, 47 . Human Rights Code, supra note 25. 48. Nixon (BCHRT), supra note 3 at para. 215. 49. The basis for this argument is tmclear, since Rape Relief clearly believes that women bom and socialized as women do share a common life experience. 50. Nixon (BCHRT), supra note 3 at paras. 218-24.
[if] Rape Reliefs exelusion of males is not prima facie diseriminatory and sex is not a binary coneept but a continuum, then exclusion of male to female transsexuals can be no more diseriminatory than exclusion of males, since both males and male to female transsexuals represent points on the continuum distinct from persons who have experienced their whole lives as females.'' Edwards J.'s analysis implies that all sex distinctions drawn by law now are equally likely to offend non-discrimination or equality principles. Perhaps it is an inevitable by-product of the growing acknowledgment that "sex" represents a continuum. Still, abandoning the presumption that legal distinctions that burden women but not men are different from the converse^^ could negatively impact women in a world that has a long way to go to achieve full sex equality.
Second, Edwards J. held that the tribunal gave the section 41 exemption an overly restrictive interpretation. In particular, he held that Rape Reliefs "political belief' about who is a woman amounted to an "article of faith" that could not be scrutinized by the tribunal, just as an article of religious dogma could not be properly scrutinized by non-believers. In other words, the belief that transgendered women who have been socialized as males are not part of a desired "identifiable group" is an "article of faith" according to which Rape Relief may exclude such persons. Edwards J.'s casual equation of a socio-political belief with an "article of faith" could create a wide swath of immunity for outright discriminatory beliefs that justify the exclusion of individuals from programs or services. For example, an organization providing a community service might, in accordance with the tenets of a particular faith, seek to serve only male clients, or an organization could seek to exclude clients who do not share certain discriminatory political beliefs. In these cases, who is entitled to scrutinize the rule? The Court's analysis suggests that "outsiders" are incompetent to engage in such scrutiny, even if persons who see themselves as members of the group disagree with the organization's interpretation (surely, a not uncommon situation). The more marginalized the group is in society, the more devastating the exclusion is to the affected individual. To simply accept Edwards J.'s notion, therefore, is to 51 risk abandoning many such "minorities within minorities." The point is not that organizations can never design exclusionary programs. The point is that the human rights regime has a duty to perform a public-minded analysis of the exclusion from a perspective of inclusion and respect. Third, Edwards J. found that the Law framework does apply to the human rights context.'^ Although the tribunal considered Nixon's complaint under the Law principles (as an alternative argument), Edwards J. held that it failed to adequately consider the "objective" dimension of a human dignity violation. ^'' Edwards J. then substituted an analysis of "human dignity" that reveals the broader risks of Rape Reliefs argument. He asserted: "The majority of persons in British Columbia (all men and those women who do not share Rape Reliefs political beliefs) would be excluded from participation in the training program."" He continued:
A reasonable person excluded for having experienced part of her life as a male, according to this argument, would recognize that what I characterize as Rape Reliefs "article of faith" as to the political and therapeutic significance of the experience of living exclusively as a female, the basis for exclusion, did not compromise the excluded person's dignity.'T his argument is worrying on several levels. First, Edwards J. appears to have said that a personal experience of discrimination shared by more people is less harmful to human dignity. Edwards J. cited no case law in support of this novel and disturbing proposition that would seem to shield from scrutiny the oppression of majority groups. Second, Edwards J. failed to consider that the reasonable "British Columbian" in his scenario most likely would not perceive harm to his dignity because he simply does not care about, nor wish to participate in, Rape Reliefs work. Third, Edwards J. did not consider the possibility that a complainant may share in all of the beliefs held by the excluding organization, except for the The Trihunal found Ms. Nixon was "unahle to understand the challenge to her participation in the training in any but a personal way and as a challenge to her status as a woman." This, Rape Relief asserts, suggests Ms. Nixon was unahle to view her exclusion from Rape Reliefs peer counselling objectively, a factor not taken into account hy the Trihunal with respect to the impact on dignity.
55. Nixon (BSCS), supra note 3 at para. 125. 56. Ibid. particular belief that justifies his or her exclusion.^' Kimberly Nixon experienced male violence, suffered intensely for her gender dysphoria, and went to extraordinary lengths to make her physical self correspond to her emotional and mental self. She claims to support Rape Reliefs work and endorses its political principles. She also endorses Rape Reliefs desire to have a "woman-only" space-but she does not see herself as anyone other than a "woman" who should be able to join Rape Relief.
Edwards J. acknowledged the difficulties in applying an analysis developed in the context of analyzing state action-the Law test-to the human rights context. Yet, he found that it was precisely the "private"^^ nature of the exclusion that rendered Nixon's complaint a nullity:
Although in this case Rape Reliefs exclusion of Ms. Nixon is not a "law," application of the Law analytical framework to non-governmental conduct alleged to be discriminatory under the Code requires that it be treated as such for analytical purposes.
However, exclusion by a small relatively obscure self-defming private organization cannot have the same impact on human dignity as legislated exclusion from a statutory benefit program. This is because any stereotyping or prejudice arising from legislated exclusion bears the imprimatur of state approval and therefore some wide public acceptance Legislated exclusion is there for all to see. Rape Reliefs exclusion of Ms. Nixon was private. That does not mean it was subjectively less hurtful to her, but it was not a public indignity.^' Edwards J.'s "human dignity" analysis suggests a pyrrhic victory for Rape Relief He seems to have had little patience with either party: 57. I recognize that this argument could apply to the other beliefs identified as a pre-requisite for joining Rape Relief, such as the belief that women have the right to choose an abortion. However, it is much easier to argue that excluding such persons is not "discriminatory" in the same way as excluding Nixon. It is possible for a person to deliberate the former issue (abortion) so as to reach a conclusion about the moral conviction one wishes to adopt. Such a process is not applicable to the basic question of whether Nixon's lack of early female socialization makes her a "peer" in the battle against male violence against women. According to Rape Relief, a woman who is opposed to abortion is still a "woman," but her political beliefs are unsuited to Rape Reliefs objects. province.
It remains to be seen which legal approach will prevail. While Nixon's claim likely will be recognized as engaging equality and non-discrimination concems, it is less certain that her particular demand to be accommodated as a "woman" within the Rape Relief collective will be vindicated.
How Transgender Claims Challenge Feminism
Sexual stereotypes are not slurs which only deal with a biological or functional meaning of sex, rather, they are created when the biological meaning of sex is measured against its social construction-gender.*'
For feminists, the claim for equal treatment on the basis of gender identity raises both principled and pragmatic concems. Feminists must confront their beliefs about who counts as a "woman"; particularize this belief to a specific subset of feminist activism; and decide whether such a debate belongs within a rights adjudication context. To the extent that transgender equality claims engage the fundamental determinants of feminist theory, those grappling with Nixon can draw lessons from the debate among so-called "first-," "second-," and "thirdwave" feminists. First-wave feminists are closely associated with a liberal ideology that seeks to minimize sexual differences and remove barriers to individual women's achievement. According to this ideology, women have been systematically hindered in their ability to access the resources needed to deal with the world and assert their place within it. For first-wave feminists, "gender" is not a particular concern because they primarily seek to remove pre-existing sex-based disadvantage. Remove such extemal hindrances (lack of child care, economic dependence, and so on), first wavers insist, and women will attain a more stable and empowered social position. Unlike first wavers, second wavers do not believe that merely neutralizing the implications of biological difference can ameliorate women's disadvantage. Second-wave feminists are more concerned with the distinction between sex and gender. These feminists accept sex as a biological given. However, they view the social construction attached to the sexes, and the distinct gender roles imposed on women, as both arbitrary (in that the "feminine" gender is not integrally related to the "female" sex) and deliberate (in that gender roles serve to perpetuate male power and domination). Some second-wave feminists, hoping to encourage a more general transition to a "female" ethos, extol so-called "feminine" qualities such as care and sensitivity." Others see the category of "feminine" as having been created in response to male needs and desires and, therefore, seek to break down the social structures that maintain and promote the latter,^''
In contrast to both first-and second-wave feminists, third-wave feminists believe that neither sex nor gender is fixed and unchanging. The third-wave critique of earlier "waves" has been described as follows:
"Third wave" feminists are critical of the acceptance of the sex/gender distinction by first and second "wave" feminisms. To accept the distinction as usefiil to feminism is to embrace the idea that there is a distinction between sex and gender. It is to accept a natural relation between sexed bodies (male/female) and culturally constructed genders (masculinity/femininity), ^T hird-wave feminists are particularly critical of second wavers for accepting that sex and biology make up "a fixed and unchanging given,"^^ as this "comes close to biological determinist views that biology determines destiny,"*^ In this perspective, third wavers closely resemble, and often include, critical gender theorists. Critical gender theorists wish to debunk the notion that "every human being naturally belongs to one of two gender categories."^* They argue that "gender" is a social construct, which is not inevitable but rather arises from powerful, and powerfully entrenched, social forces. makes little sense for a person to claim that his or her birth-assigned gender does not correspond to his or her self-perception. One may be bom a sexed being, but one is not bom "gendered." Gender is a leamed phenomenon.^' A feminist response to a substantive equality claim hy transsexuals might advocate breaking down gender divides so that transgendered persons no longer would need to "become" women. Another response, which is adopted by Rape Relief, is that gender is a complex social phenomenon that cannot he assumed through psycho-medical means. Rape Reliefs response is akin to second-wave analysis-the effects of the gender divide are so powerful and damaging that, so long as the divide persists, women's response to sexualized violence must include the power to exclude those who have not fully lived it or been subordinated hy its threat.
Transgendered persons experience gender identity issues in diverse ways. Some, such as Kimberly Nixon, determine that their gender identity does not correspond to their sex markers (chromosomes, gonads, and genitals), and they seek to alter those sex markers to the greatest possible extent. Others may perceive a gender-sex disconnect hut for various reasons'" they reject a full sex change. Others may shun the lahel of "man" or "woman" altogether, preferring to assume no gender identity. No matter what category covers them, most transgendered persons eventually confi"ont a situation involving a social response hased on a gender to which they do not ascribe. In many ways, Kimberly Nixon's situation is the easiest for the law because her "sex" changed in a radical and permanent way. The transgendered person who chooses not to undergo physical procedures poses more of a challenge. The greatest challenge exists with respect to persons who refiise to assume any sex or gender at all. To date, the law has required that a person's sex he definite and that it correspond to the person's gender. In other words, Nixon's is the most secure case from which to launch an equality rights or anti-discrimination claim. The pre-operative transsexual is most likely to obtain relief if her claim arises during the period immediately hefore a definite sex change.^' However, a resistant''^ pre-operative transsexual, or a gender nonconformist, is far less likely to prevail.
Nixon herself relied heavily on her amended hirth certificate and surgical procedures as "proof that she was a woman. The case leaves for another day the issue of how to deal with transgendered persons who do not undertake such drastic changes. It may be that post-operative transsexuality is the correct place to . 70, For example, it may be too costly, pose too great a risk to one's health, or be too disruptive of existing personal relationships. This person is often referred to as a "pre-operative" transsexual, regardless of whether they wish to undergo such an operation, 71, Pre-operative transsexuals are required as part of their therapy to live as their chosen gender. If, in the course of so doing, they encounter resistance-for example, if they are barred from using a sex-specific washroom-^they may be entitled to relief. See Marmela, supra note 13, 72, By "resistant," I mean one who refuses to submit to medical procedures to make his or her outward self correspond to gender identity.
draw the line for a "women-only" space, but such a line will have other consequences. As Paisley Currah and Shannon Minter note, "[a] narrowly drafted law may be construed to exclude gender variant people who may not identify or even necessarily be perceived as a specific 'type' of 'transgender person.'"''' To the extent that it requires a diagnosis of gender identity disorder, a "clinical" definition excludes many persons. Some transgendered persons resist such a diagnosis because they do not wish to be characterized as suffering from a mental disorder. Others are unwilling to subject themselves to highly invasive, painfiil procedures. Still others remain "on the fence" but wish to be treated on the basis of their chosen gender.'" Rape Reliefs resistance to recognizing even Kimberly Nixon as a "woman," then, is partly attributable to the fear of opening a Pandora's box that will complicate attempts to exclude other, more challenging categories of persons, up to and including men. Recall that Rape Relief accepts that the line between "male" and "female" is a continuum. Nonetheless, Rape Relief firmly believes that it should be able to maintain its space as "women-only"-that is, that men should continue to be excluded. In other words, the mere recognition of the biological reality that sex is a continuum does not correct the social reality that sex difference still provides the basis and justification for inequality between men and women.'^ Strikingly, Nixon and her allies defend this belief too. For example. Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE) issued a press release that, while supportive of Nixon, carefully affirmed "the right of women's organizations (including Rape Relief) to maintain a women's-only space and to politically organize with peers."'* Essentially, Rape Relief has called on Nixon and her supporters to show how their stopping point along the continuum is any less subject to challenge, for example, by men.
Some might argue that Rape Relief is fear mongering-that its concems are not realistic. And, indeed, it is likely that few men would seek to join the Rape Relief collective outright. Yet the prospect remains. In 1988, a man tried to take self-defence classes at the Wendo Women's Self Defence Organization and, when refused entry, brought a human rights complaint. Michael Celik argued that he had experienced violent attacks and wished to learn to defend himself Eventually the complaint was thrown out for being vexatious," but not before Wendo expended significant resources-financial and otherwise-fighting it. It is naive to assume that no men would use the opportunity to enter and destabilize a noted and outspoken women's rights advocate such as Rape Relief Aside from the risk of "saboteurs," there is the sheer difficulty of a small, under-resourced organization such as Rape Relief having to deal with persons who identify as women but do not seek to transform their physicality or with persons who do not identify as women or men but nonetheless wish to become members. What principle requires Rape Relief to accept Kimberly Nixon but permits it to exclude these others? Consider also the appropriate treatment of female-to-male transsexuals. Such persons have been socialized as women but have turned away from this identity. Have they any role to play in a "womanidentified" political movement? One case illustrates a situation that may eventually confront Rape Relief or similar organizations. In 1999, the Portland Lesbian Community Project's (LCP) only paid staff member announced that he was a female-to-male transsexual and would henceforth be known as a man. The staff member wished to remain in the collective. The community project responded by deleting the words "woman" and "women" from its bylaws, essentially eliminating its women-only focus. ^^ The project thus became open to "any person who supports the purpose of LCP," while the category of voting membership was restricted to "any self-identified individual woman who supports the purpose of LCP."'' Is Rape Relief wrong to fear similar incursions? The answer will require difficult and delicate negotiations of multiple sensibilities and profoundly held beliefs. It is not unreasonable, however, for Rape Relief to fear the possibility of such an event.
Finally, an important aspect of the Nixon claim is its location at the intersection of male and female engagement with the problem of male violence against women. Part of some feminists' visceral response to Nixon is the spectre of a male intrusion into female space characterized by a particular kind of political organizing that they believe requires sex-exclusivity. The situation is rendered more complex because of Nixon's own experience of male violence-an experience shared by many persons like her. Nixon has a deep personal interest in mobilizing against male violence, yet, in a sense, she once occupied the very social space from which such violence emanates. As well, Nixon did not seek counseling from Rape Relief She did not approach Rape Relief as a victim. She approached Rape Relief with something to offer. It is appropriate to consider her relatively empowered stance when determining the response that most corresponds with fairness, equality, and dignity.
Challenges and Choices for Feminist Rights Projects
Not only does Nixon bring to the surface some of the assumptions underlying feminist theory but it also challenges feminists to assess the impact of an undifferentiated focus on litigation as a feminist strategy. A vigorous debate has detailed the perils and potential of feminist rights discourse and litigation. Some objections to such strategies are that rights discourse is invariably totalizing and incapable of adjudicating any but the simplest, most unsophisticated claims;*" that rights litigation serves only to validate a system of legal relations that are predicated upon the systematic subordination of most people;*' that rights discourse seeks to claim a foothold for (white) women in a (white) man's world;*t hat rights litigation drains energy from more direct political strategies and engagement;*^ and that rights discourse affirmatively promotes "an image ofthe rights-bearer as a radically autonomous individual" at the expense of the "social dimensions of human personhood."*'' Much feminist engagement with the law has been reactive-that is, in direct response to aggressive legal action by men.*^ This fact acts as both a defence against the above charges*^ and, to some scholars, further proof of the perverse nature of rights. Many persons conclude that the entrenchment of rights in the Canadian legal system and the fact that legal rights have become the principal means through which much social policy is now debated has not led to appreciably better lives for the most disadvantaged but rather has only strengthened the position ofthe advantaged.
Discussing rights-based strategies, Mark Tushnet observes: [R]ights-talk often conceals a claim that things ought to be different within an argument that things are as the claimant contends. That masquerade is sometimes successfiil, at least until the claim is rejected by the courts or by the wider audience for the claim. It is successful because the language of rights is so open and indeterminate that opposing parties can use the same kind of language to express their positions. Because rights-talk is indeterminate, it can only provide momentary advantages in ongoing political struggles.*N ixon illustrates Tushnet's point. In an important sense, both parties are making the same argument-^that women require, and are entitled to, a sex-segregated space in which to heal from and organize against male violence. They disagree on who gets to be a part of that space. Both parties are familiar and comfortable with "rights talk," and one of the reasons the case poses such difficulties for feminists is that there are compelling arguments on both sides. It is difficult for a feminist to know, exactly, what to do about Nixon.
Arguments in favour of proceeding with claims such as Nixon's have been made forcefully:
What's at stake for trans should this case be lost? It is very likely that other groups and services will begin to limit their services to trans and that it will not only be women. As things presently stand there are alot holding pattem [sic] . If trans can be discredited for self-identifying their gender/sex, that will severely undermine the feminist principles of choice and autonomy. If trans can be discriminated against despite being medically-identified in their new gender/sex, the issue will undermine the current level of acceptance and the dams that are holding back the words of HATE and acts of prejudice will surely burst.*Ŵ hile the sincerity of the plea is unmistakable, one may be excused for wondering if Nixon could so undermine the "trans" movement. Clearly, rights discourse is significant and meaningful for many persons. Rights have been called "a most usefiil sort of moral furniture ... It is claiming rights that gives them their moral significance."*' As Patricia Williams writes, "for the historically disempowered the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity."'" The very process of making a rights claim involves entry into a particular aspect of human affairs-engagement with the world as a moral agent to whom attention must be paid. Nonetheless, for some, the Nixon complaint exemplifies the "Frankenstein"-like quality ofthe (feminist) (equality) rights project.
The particular framework of the claim-counseling services to female survivors of (mostly) male violence in which the complainant has offered, not requested, assistance-also may impact the response to Nixon's claim. Consider the following statement from a "trans activist": I'm a feminist transwoman, and have been for a very long time now. I recognize the need for good support services for women leaving domestic abuse situations, for women to have effective intervention in rape crises, and access to abortion services. I'd say that men need many similar such services. But I also recognize that my presence in those environments may not be the most effective way for me to support those services precisely because the service is not about me or my rights. Most people aren't suited for this kind of work, including most transwomen.^' This quote raises a controversial point, namely the degree to which Nixon herself should exercise discretion and responsibility over the terrain where she chooses to fight her battle for recognition.
Who owes what duty to whom? The BC Human Rights Code sets out, inter alia, the following purposes: "to promote a climate of understanding and mutual respect where all are equal in dignity and rights ... [and] to provide a means of redress for those persons who are discriminated against contrary to this Code."^T he Code thus seeks to validate all persons' right to equal dignity and respect and to remedy specific acts of discrimination. The latter goal is easily traced through the prohibited grounds of discrimination in particular services or employment offered to the public. The former, however, is more elusive, as its referent is an underlying ethos, a social arrangement in which each person treats everyone else with basic respect and dignity. Can the commitment to respect and dignity embodied by the Code be expressed and encouraged through the Nixon case?
A former chief commissioner ofthe BC Human Rights Commission analyzed the trans/feminist confiict this way:
I believe that women's organizations must listen and be open to trans and inter-sexed women-society reached an understanding of gender discrimination by listening to women-and so women's organizations can learn about the lives and gender oppression suffered by trans people hy listening to them. Trans people suffer discrimination from the same standardized gender-based system in many of the same ways that women do-and social justice for all women means that discrimination in all its forms is not to be tolerated, including transphobia. I believe that women's organizations have the same responsibility not to discriminate as any other service or workplace, and they're just as vulnerable to human rights complaints. The rulings have shown that trans women are entitled to be treated as women, that they're entitled to volunteer with and provide services at women's organizations and that excluding particular groups of women without individual assessment or accommodation may be problematic and discriminatory.^Ô f course, women's organizations must adhere to principles of equality and respect in their dealings with others. Still, the above quote is troubling for its rather nonchalant equation of women's organizations with any other (powerful, male-dominated) entity that is subject to human rights law. The speaker adopts a simple "treat likes alike" analysis that pays little attention to the context in which some such organizations find themselves. Under a general understanding of a human rights "ethos," Rape Relief should treat Nixon with respect. Rape Relief also must ensure its clients appropriate and effective services and abide by its explicit goal to provide the best framework from which to mount a political battle to end male violence against women.
Nixon also has "duties" although they are not always visible in a human rights framework. One does not generally describe human rights complainants as "owing" anyone anything. However, the usual approach is deficient in the Nixon case. As a self-described feminist and anti-violence advocate, Nixon has a duty to consider the import of her actions as they contribute to, or denigrate from, that larger goal. More significantly, as a "feminist" apparently committed to the overall betterment of women, Nixon needs to consider what her claim may do to the cohesion and vitality of the women's movement. Does all of this mean that Nixon should not have launched her complaint? Perhaps. The Nixon case raises the possibility that an individual's choice to press for legal recognition of a right is at least as important an issue as whether she enjoys the right in the first place. Even if Nixon has a valid claim she can still be criticized for asserting that claim against Rape Relief. Not every situation is suited to state intervention, nor is every alleged violation best resolved through a public dispute resolution process. However, Rape Relief has responsibilities and duties as well. These include a duty to respect the purpose of the Human Rights Code and a more particular duty to provide appropriate services to clients. Yet, as an important and noted player in the women's equality movement. Rape Relief has the additional responsibility to consider the impact of its arguments on women generally and on the legal development of human rights and equality law. As discussed earlier,''' Rape Relief adopted a provocative stand when it sought to incorporate into human rights law a controversial aspect of section 15 jurisprudence. The fiill impact of Rape Reliefs arguments remains to be evaluated. If Rape Relief is asked to account for its choices, a simple though understandable desire to win the case may not suffice.
Nixon suggests that rights advocates, including feminists, should resist the temptation to transform every dispute into a legal journey. Discussions with feminists reveal this conclusion as a common attitude to the Nixon complaint and its continued presence in the judicial system. While not wishing to trivialize Nixon's experience, it is unsurprising that many feminists might react to her claim in this way. Nixon seems to be the ultimate "lose-lose" case. What, exactly, does Nixon gain from victory: state-coerced entry into a space dedicated to assisting victims of violence and advocating for women's rights or, alternatively, a cash settlement from a financially strapped non-profit organization? Nixon has a legal right not to be discriminated against on the basis of the fact that she is a transgendered person but should she push for that right in every circumstance and against every alleged transgressor?^'
This article does not endorse the anti-Charter perspective that framing disputes as rights issues is fimdamentally misleading and counter-productive. The author recognizes the continued need for such initiatives.^* Nonetheless, Nixon represents a perilous path for feminists and like-minded allies. The chief problem is the extraordinary difficulty posed by trying to trace out a "feminist" response in a context that, ultimately, can vindicate only one party. This article concludes that no such response is likely to be forthcoming. Nixon eludes a feminist result compatible with the modem human rights regime. Under generally accepted principles and precedents, Nixon's claim is stronger than Rape Reliefs defence. As described earlier, Edwards J.'s judgment for Rape Relief opens too many loopholes in the current scheme of human rights protection. However, to simply force Rape Relief, or organizations similar to it, to accept women such as Nixon,'î s to adopt a completely formal, decontextualized remedy that is blind to the realities of working and advocating in a feminist space in which sex segregation is deemed to be essential and is permitted by law. It is to ignore the social and political reality of male-on-female violence in order to accommodate the selfperception of a former man who is now, legally, a woman. This is not the kind of case that the feminist movement needs.
The charge could be made that this analysis is negative and unhelpful to the resolution of the case. The point I wish to make is that there is no legal resolution that avoids doing deep harm to the feminist rights project, either by trivializing the unique context of women's organizations seeking to do political and legal work to combat male (sexual) violence, or by demeaning the deep feelings of alienation and exclusion of transgendered persons who seek to be a full part of that movement. The debate cannot be reduced to a human rights complaint-the struggle is a political one that belongs to the movement alone.
Conclusion
Might Nixon have proceeded differently? The initial complaint does not appear to have extended beyond the parties. Nixon started the process very soon after her experience. Once the commission accepted the complaint, Rape Relief responded on, first, jurisdictional and, then, substantive grounds. Significantly, neither party appears to have engaged in broader consultation with the women's movement nor does the record reveal attempts at negotiation or mediation. The absence of such initiatives is surprising given that consultation and coalition work has been an important part of feminist litigation.'* Nor was there broader discussion between the parties or between them and the other parts of the women's movement over the appropriate response to the initial tribunal decision. There does not seem to have been much consideration of allowing the case to end, which would have required sacrifice on the part of the "loser" (Rape Relief at the tribunal level; Nixon at the British Columbia Supreme Court), but would have significantly lowered the stakes. Instead, the case went on, and its unwinnable parameters-with the unpalatable results sure to flow therefiom-risk being incorporated into human rights and equality precedent.
What can feminists learn from Nixon? Though the case continues to proceed,'' it has highlighted a variety of issues. First, many advocates, including feminists, have a tendency to evade some of the most difficult questions regarding the limits of rights, including what they can actually accomplish and how to deal with inter-rights conflict. The principal means of this evasion is the reliance upon legal discourse. Advocates can push for a particular remedy-say, extension of equal pay for work of equal value-^without having to face uncomfortable choices related to the state's finite resources and who owes what duty to whom. The Nixon case cannot be so easily shunted aside because it is addressed to women in a particular way and it touches the very meaning of one's existence as a "woman."
Second, feminists have yet to resolve the debate between gender as essentialism and gender as social construction. Concepts of gender and sex are used-sometimes interchangeably-in a strategic, rather than principled, fashion, so as to yield a particular outcome. Argtiments that rest on biological determinism 98. The emergence of coalitions as an integral part of feminist legal strategy is described in Jhappan, supra note 81 at 78; and Mathen, "Introduction," supra note 86 at xxii. 99. As of the writing of this article, the case is before the BC Court of Appeal. grounds are used or discarded at will. The choice to straddle the fence is not necessarily wrong. The point is that Nixon forces feminists to make a choice about how to use sex and gender, and the movement is ill-equipped to do so. Finally, Nixon reveals the risks of the feminist rights project. It is unsettling to assert that the Nixon case would have been better resolved in the socio-political realm. This is not the same thing as concluding that Rape Reliefs exclusion of Kimherley Nixon was legitimate. However, it is simply not apparent what major benefit is realized from taking Nixon forward in the legal realm when feminists are so divided over the very definition of what it means to be a "woman." Surely it is better for those in the movement to, first, strive for honest discussion and common understanding than to submit adversarial arguments for resolution from a removed adjudicator. Nixon is best left to the political realm because the stakes of the precise conflict are not of the magnitude to demand an imposed reconciliation, and no court or tribunal can truly settle the broader debate. The difficult issues underlying Nixon-the conflict between some feminists and some transgendered persons-can be addressed only within the movement itself
